Mr. Chairman:
Permit me to make a few observations on this great
question. It is with great difficulty I prevail on myself to
enter into the debate, when I consider the great abilities of
those gentlemen who have already spoken on the subject.
But as I am urged by my duty to my constituents, and as I
conceive that the different manner of treating the subject
may make different impressions, I shall offer my
observations with diffident respect, but with firmness and
independence. I will promise my acknowledgments to those
honorable gentlemen who were in the Federal Convention,
for the able and satisfactory manner in which they
discharged their duty to their country. The introductory
expression of "We, the people," has been thought improper
by the honorable gentleman. I expected no such objection as
this. Ought not the people, sir, to judge of that government
whereby they are to be ruled? We are, sir, deliberating on a
question of great consequence to the people of America,
and to the world in general. We ought, therefore, to decide
with extreme caution and circumspection; it is incumbent
upon us to proceed without prejudice or prepossession. No
member of the committee entertains a greater regard than
myself for the gentleman on the other side, who has placed
himself in the front of opposition. [Mr. Henry.] No man
admires more than I do his declamatory talents; but I trust
that neither declamation nor elegance of periods will
mislead the judgment of any member here, and that nothing
but the force of reasoning will operate conviction. He has
asked, with an air of triumph, whether the Confederation
was not adequate to the purposes of the Federal
Government. Permit me to say, No. If, sir, perfection existed
in that system, why was the Federal Convention called? Why
did every State except Rhode Island send deputies to that
convention?
Was it not from a persuasion of its inefficacy? If this be
not sufficient to convince him, let me call the recollection of
the honorable gentleman to other circumstances. Let him go
into the interior parts of the country and inquire into the
situation of the farmers. He will be told that tobacco and
other produce are miserably low, merchandise dear, and
taxes high. Let him go through the United States. He will
perceive appearances of ruin and decay everywhere. Let him
visit the seacoast - go to our ports and inlets. In those ports,
sir, where we had every reason to see the fleets of all nations,
he will behold but a few trifling little boats; he will
everywhere see commerce languish, the disconsolate
merchant, with his arms folded, ruminating, in despair, on
the wretched ruins of his fortune, and deploring the
impossibility of retrieving it. The West Indies are blocked up
against us. Not the British only, but other nations, exclude us
from those islands: our fur trade has gone to Canada; British
sentinels are within our own territories; our imposts are
withheld. To these distresses we may add the derangement
of our finances; yet the honorable gentleman tells us they are
not sufficient to justify so radical a change. Does he know
the consequences of deranged finances? What confusions,
disorders, and even revolutions, have resulted from this
cause, in many nations! Look at France at this time: that
kingdom is almost convulsed; ministers of state, and first
princes of the blood, banished; manufacturers and
merchants become bankrupt, and the people discontented -
all owing to the derangement of their finances.
The honorable gentleman must be well acquainted with
the debts due by the United States, and how much is due to
foreign nations. Has not the payment of these been
shamefully withheld? How long, sir, shall we be able, by fair
promises, to satisfy these creditors? How long can we amuse,
by idle words, those who are amply possessed of the means
of doing themselves justice? No part of the principal is paid
to those nations, nor has even the interest been paid as
honorably and punctually as it ought. Nay, we were obliged
to borrow money last year to pay the interest. What! borrow
money to discharge the interest of what was borrowed, and
continually augment the amount of the public debt! Such a
plan would destroy the richest country on earth. What is to
be done? Compel the delinquent States to pay requisitions
to Congress? How are they to be compelled? By the
instrumentality of such a scheme as was proposed to be
introduced in the year 1784? Is this cruel mode of
compulsion eligible? Is it consistent with the spirit of
republicanism? This savage mode, which could be made use
of under the Confederation, leads directly to civil war and
destruction. How different is this from the genius of the
proposed constitution! By this proposed plan, the public
money is to be collected by mild and gentle means; by a
peaceable and friendly application to the individuals of the
community: whereas, by the other scheme, the public
treasury must be supplied through the medium of the sword,
by desolation and murder - by the blood of the citizens. Yet
we are told that there is too much energy in this system.
Coercion is necessary in every government. Justice, sir,
cannot be done without it. It is more necessary in federal
governments than any other, because of the natural
imbecility of such governments.
The honorable gentleman is possessed of much
historical knowledge. I appeal to that knowledge therefore.
Will he not agree that there was a coercive power in the
federal government of the Amphictyonics? The coercive
power of the Amphictyonic Council was so great as to enable
it to punish disobedience and refractory behavior in the most
severe manner. Is there not an instance of its carrying fire
and sword through the territories, and leveling to the ground
the towns, of those who disobeyed it? [Here Mr. Corbin
mentions particular instances.] Is there no coercion in the
Germanic body? This body, though composed of three
hundred different component sovereignties, principalities,
and cities, and divided into nine circles, is controlled by one
superintending power, the emperor. Is there no coercive
power in the confederate government of the Swiss? In the
alliance between them and France, there is a provision
whereby the latter is to interpose and settle differences that
may arise among them; and this interposition has been more
than once used. Is there none in Holland? What is the
stadtholder? This power is necessary in all governments; a
superintending coercive power is absolutely indispensable.
This does not exist under the present Articles of
Confederation. To vest it with such a power, on its present
construction, without any alteration, would be extremely
dangerous, and might lead to civil war. Gentlemen must,
before this, have been convinced of the necessity of an
alteration. Our State vessel has sprung a leak; we must
embark in a new bottom, or sink into perdition.
The honorable gentleman has objected to the
Constitution on the old worn-out idea that a republican
government is best calculated for a small territory. If a
republic, sir, cannot be accommodated to an extensive
country, let me ask, how small must a country be to suit the
genius of republicanism? In what particular extent of
country can a republican government exist? If contracted
into as small a compass as you please, it must labor under
many disadvantages. Too small an extent will render a
republic weak, vulnerable, and contemptible. Liberty in such
a petty state must be on a precarious footing; its existence
must depend on the philanthropy and good nature of its
neighbors. Too large an extent, it is said, will produce
confusion and tyranny. What has been so often deprecated
will be removed by this plan. The extent of the United States
cannot render the government oppressive. The powers of the
General Government are only of a general nature, and their
object is to protect, defend, and strengthen the United
States; but the internal administration of government is left
to the State legislatures, who exclusively retain such powers
as will give the States the advantages of small republics,
without the danger commonly attendant on the weakness of
such governments.
There are controversies even about the name of this
government. It is denominated by some a federal, by others
a consolidated government. The definition given of it by my
honorable friend [Mr. Madison] is, in my opinion, accurate.
Let me, however, call it by another name - a representative
federal republic, as contradistinguished from a confederacy.
The former is more wisely constructed than the latter; it
places the remedy in the hands which feel the disorder: the
other places the remedy in those hands which cause the
disorder. The evils that are most complained of in such
governments (and with justice) are faction, dissension, and
consequent subjection of the minority to the caprice and
arbitrary decisions of the majority, who, instead of
consulting the interest of the whole community collectively,
attend sometimes to partial and local advantages. To avoid
this evil is perhaps the great desideratum of republican
wisdom; it may be termed the philosopher's stone. Yet, sir,
this evil will be avoided by this Constitution: faction will be
removed by the system now under consideration, because all
the causes which are generally productive of faction are
removed. This evil does not take its flight entirely; for were
jealousies and divisions entirely at an end, it might produce
such lethargy as would ultimately terminate in the
destruction of liberty, to the preservation of which
watchfulness is absolutely necessary. It is transferred from
the State legislatures to Congress, where it will be more
easily controlled. Faction will decrease in proportion to the
diminution of counselors. It is much easier to control it in
small than in large bodies. Our State legislature consists of
upwards of one hundred and sixty, which is a greater number
than Congress will consist of at first. Will not more concord
and unanimity exist in one than in thirteen such bodies?
Faction will more probably decrease, or be entirely removed,
if the interest of a nation be entirely concentrated, than if
entirely diversified. If, thirteen men agree, there will be no
faction. Yet if opposite, and of heterogeneous dispositions,
it is impossible that a majority of such clashing minds can
ever concur to oppress the minority. It is impossible that this
Government, which will make us one people, will have a
tendency to assimilate our situations, and is admirably
calculated to produce harmony and unanimity, can ever
admit of an oppressive combination by one part of the
Union against the other.
A confederate government is, of all others, best
calculated for an extensive country. Its component individual
governments are, of all others, best calculated for an
extensive country. Its component individual governments
administer and afford all the local conveniences that the
most compact governments can do; and the strength and
energy of the confederacy may be equal to those of any
government. A government of this kind may extend to all the
Western World; nay, I may say, ad infinitum. But
it is needless to dwell any longer on this subject; for the
objection that an extensive territory is repugnant to a
republican government applies against this and every State
in the Union, except Delaware and Rhode Island. Were the
objection well founded, a republican government could exist
in none of the States, except those two. Such an argument
goes to the dissolution of the Union, and its absurdity is
demonstrated by our own experience.
But an objection is urged against this government
because of its power of laying direct taxes. Let us ask the
honorable gentleman who opposes it on this ground, if he
reflect whether this power be indispensable or not. Sir, if it
be not vested with the power of commanding all the
resources of the State, when necessary, it will be trifling.
Wars are as much (and more) carried on by the length of the
purse as by that of the sword. They cannot be carried on
without money. Unless this power be given to Congress,
foreign nations may crush you. The concession of this power
is necessary to do Virginia justice, by compelling the
delinquent States to pay as well as she. While she paid her
quotas, and her citizens were much distressed to pay their
taxes, other States most shamefully neglected or refused to
pay their proportions. I trust gentlemen need not be alarmed
on the subject of taxation, nor intimidated by the idea of
double collectors, who, they tell us, will oppress and ruin the
people. From our attention to our situation, we shall see that
this mode of levying money, though indispensably necessary
on great emergencies, will be but seldom recurred to. Let us
attend to the finances of this country...
The honorable gentleman declared in the most solemn
manner, that, if he could see one single trait in that
government to secure liberty, he would not object to it. I
meet him on this ground. Liberty is secured, sir, by the
limitation of its powers, which are clearly and unequivocally
defined, and which are to be exercised by our own
representatives freely chosen. What power is given that will
endanger liberty? I consider all the traits of this system as
having a tendency to the security of our liberty. I consider all
its powers necessary, and only given to avoid greater evils;
and if this conclusion of mine be well founded, let me ask if
public liberty is not secured by bars and adamantine bolts -
secured by the strongest guards and checks which human
ingenuity can invent. Will this dread power of taxation
render liberty insecure? Sir, without this power, other
powers will answer no purpose. Government cannot exist
without the means; of procuring money. My honorable
friend told us he considered this clause as the vitals of the
Constitution. I will change the phrase, and say that I
consider this part as the lungs of the Constitution. If it be
sick, the whole system is consumptive, and must soon decay;
and this power can never be dangerous if the principles of
equal and free representation be fully attended to. While the
right of suffrage is secured, we have little to fear. This
Government, sir, fully secures us this noble privilege, on the
purest and simplest principles of equality. That number
which, in any part of the country, has a right to send a
representative, has the same right in another part. What
does the Constitution say? That thirty thousand shall have
one representative, no matter where. If this be not equal
representation, what, in the name of God, is equal
representation? But, says the honorable gentleman, the
Constitution may be satisfied by one from each State. I
conceive there is no fear of this. There is not a power to
diminish the number. Does it not say that representatives
shall be apportioned according to the number of the people,
and that direct taxes shall be regulated by the same rules?
Virginia, in the first instance, will have ten times as many as
Delaware, and afterwards in proportion to their numbers.
What is the criterion of representation? They have their
wish: for the qualifications which the laws of the States
require to entitle a man to vote for a State representative are
the qualifications required by this plan to vote for a
representative to Congress; and in this State, and most of the
others, the possession of a freehold is necessary to entitle a
man to the privilege of a vote. Do they wish persons to be
represented? Here also they are indulged, for the number of
representatives is determined by the number of people. This
idea is so well attended to, that even three-fifths of those
who are not free are included among those of whom thirty
thousand shall have a right to elect one representative; so
that, in either point of view, their wish is gratified. Is not
liberty secured on this foundation? If it be not secured by
one or the other mode, or by both, I am totally without
reason. Liberty seems intrenched on this ground.
But the gentleman objects that the number is not
sufficient. My opinion, with deference to that gentleman,
and others who may be of different opinion from me, is that
it is fully sufficient. Being delegated solely for general
purposes, a few intelligent men will suffice; at least one from
every thirty thousand, aided by the Senate, seems sufficient.
Are combinations or factions so often formed in small as in
numerous bodies? Are laws better made in large than in
small assemblies? Is not the influence of popular declaimers
less in small than in great bodies? Would not a more
numerous representation be very expensive? Is economy of
no consideration? We ought, sir, to attend to the situation of
the people; and our measures should be as economical as
possible, without extending, however, our parsimony to a
dangerous length. Objections should be founded on just and
real grounds, and ought not to be urged out of a mere
obstinacy. Besides, it is by no means certain that a very
numerous body is more independent, or upright, than a
small one Why should the number of our representatives be
greater, Mr. Chairman? The county of Middlesex, in
England, which includes the cities of London and
Westminster, contains upwards of nine hundred and ninety
thousand souls, and yet sends to Parliament no more than
eight Members. Among all the clamors of the people there,
it never entered the brain of any of them that these eight
were not enough. They complain that the boroughs of Old
Sarum, Newton, and Gatton, and other such places, should
send each two Members to Parliament, although without
houses or inhabitants, while the richest city sends but four.
They also complain of the influence of the landed interest in
some cases; that the county of Cornwall sends forty
Members to Parliament, although it pays but eighteen parts,
out of five hundred and thirteen, to the subsidy and land tax,
when the county of Middlesex, which is calculated to pay two
hundred and fifty parts out of five hundred and thirteen,
sends but eight Members. In that country, it has been
uniformly found that those Members, who are chosen by
numerous respectable electors, make the greatest opposition
to oppression and corruption, and signalize themselves for
the preservation of liberty. The collective body of the
Commons there have generally exerted themselves in the
defense of freedom, and have been successful in their
exertions, notwithstanding the inequality of their election.
Our representatives are chosen in the fairest manner; their
election is founded in absolute equality. Is the American
spirit so degenerated, notwithstanding these advantages, that
the love of liberty is more predominant and warm in the
breast of a Briton than in that of an American? When liberty
is on a more solid foundation here than in Britain, will
Americans be less ready to maintain and defend it than
Britons? No, sir; the spirit of liberty and independence of
the people of this country, at present, is such that they could
not be enslaved under any government that could be
described. What danger is there, then, to be apprehended
from a government which is theoretically perfect, and the
possible blemishes of which can only be demonstrated by
actual experience?
The honorable gentleman then urges an objection
respecting the militia, who, he tells us, will be made the
instruments of tyranny to deprive us of our liberty. Your
militia, says he, will fight against you. Who are the militia?
Are we not militia? Shall we fight against ourselves? No, sir;
the idea is absurd. We are also terrified by the dread of a
standing army. It cannot be denied that we ought to have the
means of defense, and be able to repel an attack.
If some of the community are exclusively inured to its
defense, and the rest attend to agriculture, the consequence
will be that the arts of war and defense and of cultivating the
soil will be understood. Agriculture will flourish, and military
discipline will be perfect. If, on the contrary, our defense be
solely intrusted to militia, ignorance of arms and negligence
of farming will ensue; the former plan is, in every respect,
more to the interest of the State. By it we shall have good
farmers and soldiers; by the latter we shall have neither. If
the inhabitants be called out on sudden emergencies of war,
their crops, the means of their subsistence, may be destroyed
by it. If we are called in the time of sowing seed, or of
harvest, the means of subsistence might be lost; and the loss
of one year's crop might have been prevented by a trivial
expense, if appropriated to the purpose of supporting a part
of the community, exclusively occupied in the defense of the
whole. I conceive that this idea, if it be a new one, is yet
founded on solid and very substantial reasons. But, sir, we
are told of the expediency and propriety of previous
amendments. What end would it answer to attempt it? Will
the States which have adopted the Constitution rescind their
adopting resolutions? Had we adopted it, would we recede
from it to please the caprice of any other State? Pride, sir,
revolts at the idea. Admitting this State proposes
amendments previous to her adoption, must there not be
another Federal Convention? Must there not be also a
convention in each State? Suppose some of our proposed
conditions be rejected, will not our exclusion from the Union
be the consequence? Or would other conventions again be
called, and be eternally revolving and devising expedients,
without coming to a final decision? The loss of the union, sir,
must be the result of a pertinacious demand of precedent
conditions. My idea is, that we should go hand in hand with
Massachusetts; adopt it first, and then propose amendments
of a general nature, for local ones cannot be expected.
Consider the situation of Massachusetts, commanding the
North, and the importance and respectability of Virginia to
the South. These, sir, are the two most populous, wealthy,
and powerful States in the Union. Is it not very probable that
their influence would have very great weight in carrying any
amendments? Would any gentleman turn a deaf ear to their
solicitations? By union alone can we exist; by no other means
can we be happy. Union must be the object of every
gentleman here. I never yet have heard any gentleman so
wild and frantic in his opposition as to avow an attachment
to partial confederacies. By previous adoption, the union will
be preserved; by insisting on alterations previous to our
adoption, the union may be lost, and our political happiness
destroyed by internal dissensions. I trust, therefore, that this
convention, after deliberate discussion, will not hesitate to
determine on a previous ratification of a system which, even
in its present form, seems competent to the perpetual
preservation of our security and happiness.
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