Mr. Chairman and Fellow Citizens:
Having received the honor of an
appointment to represent you in the late convention, it is perhaps, my
duty to comply with the request of many gentlemen whose characters and
judgments I sincerely respect, and who have urged, that this would be a
proper occasion to lay before you any information which will serve to
explain and elucidate the principles and arrangements of the
constitution, that has been submitted to the consideration of the United
States. I confess that I am unprepared for so extensive and so important
a disquisition; but the insidious attempts which are clandestinely and
industriously made to pervert and destroy the new plan, induce me the
more readily to engage in its defence; and the impressions of four
months constant attention to the subject, have not been so easily
effaced as to leave me without an answer to the objections which have
been raised
It will be proper however, before I enter into the refutation of
the charges that are alleged, to mark the leading discrimination between
the State constitutions and the constitution of the United States. When
the people established the powers of legislation under their separate
governments, they invested their representatives with every right and
authority which they did not in explicit terms reserve; and therefore
upon every question respecting the jurisdiction of the House of
Assembly, if the frame of government is silent, the jurisdiction is
efficient and complete. But in delegating federal powers, another
criterion was necessarily introduced, and the congressional power is to
be collected, not from tacit implication, but from the positive grant
expressed in the instrument of the union. Hence, it is evident, that in
the former case everything which is not reserved is given; but in the
latter the reverse of the proposition prevails, and everything which is
not given is reserved.
This distinction being recognized, will furnish an answer to
those who think the omission of a bill of rights a defect in the
proposed constitution; for it would have been superfluous and absurd to
have stipulated with a federal body of our own creation, that we should
enjoy those privileges of which we are not divested, either by the
intention or the act that has brought the body into existence. For
instance, the liberty of the press, which has been a copious source of
declamation and opposition - what control can proceed from the Federal
government to shackle or destroy that sacred palladium of national
freedom? If, indeed, a power similar to that which has been granted for
the regulation of commerce had been granted to regulate literary
publications, it would have been as necessary to stipulate that the
liberty of the press should be preserved inviolate, as that the impost
should be general in its operation. With respect likewise to the
particular district of ten miles, which is to be made the seat of
federal government, it will undoubtedly be proper to observe this
salutary precaution, as there the legislative power will be exclusively
lodged in the President, Senate, and House of Representatives of the
United States. But this could not be an object with the Convention, for
it must naturally depend upon a future compact, to which the citizens
immediately interested will, and ought to be, parties; and there is no
reason to suspect that so popular a privilege will in that case be
neglected. In truth, then, the proposed system possesses no influence
whatever upon the press, and it would have been merely nugatory to have
introduced a formal declaration upon the subject - nay, that very
declaration might have been construed to imply that some degree of power
was given, since we undertook to define its extent.
Another objection that has been fabricated against the new
constitution, is expressed in this disingenuous form - "The trial by
jury is abolished in civil cases." I must be excused, my fellow
citizens, if upon this point I take advantage of my professional
experience to detect the futility of the assertion. Let it be remembered
then, that the business of the Federal Convention was not local, but
general - not limited to the views and establishments of a single State,
but co-extensive with the continent, and comprehending the views and
establishments of thirteen independent sovereignties When, therefore,
this subject was in discussion, we were involved in difficulties which
pressed on all sides, and no precedent could be discovered to direct our
course. The cases open to a trial by jury differed in the different
States. It was therefore impracticable, on that ground, to have made a
general rule. The want of uniformity would have rendered any reference
to the practice of the States idle and useless; and it could not with
any propriety be said that, "The trial by jury shall be as heretofore,"
since there has never existed any federal system of jurisprudence, to
which the declaration could relate. Besides, it is not in all cases that
the trial by jury is adopted in civil questions; for cases depending in
courts of admiralty, such as relate to maritime captures, and such as
are agitated in courts of equity, do not require the intervention of
that tribunal. How, then was the line of discrimination to be drawn? The
Convention found the task too difficult for them, and they left the
business as it stands, in the fullest confidence that no danger could
possibly ensue, since the proceedings of the Supreme Court are to be
regulated by the Congress, which is a faithful representation of the
people; and the oppression of government is effectually barred, by
declaring that in all criminal cases the trial by jury shall be
preserved.
This constitution, it has been further urged, is of a pernicious
tendency, because it tolerates a standing army in the time of peace.
This has always been a topic of popular declamation; and yet I do not
know a nation in the world which has not found it necessary and useful
to maintain the appearance of strength in a season of the most profound
tranquility. Nor is it a novelty with us; for under the present articles
of confederation, Congress certainly possesses this reprobated power,
and the exercise of that power is proved at this moment by her
cantonments along the banks of the Ohio. But what would be our national
situation were it otherwise? Every principle of policy must be
subverted, and the government must declare war, before they are prepared
to carry it on. Whatever may be the provocation, however important the
object in view, and however necessary dispatch and secrecy may be, still
the declaration must precede the preparation, and the enemy will be
informed of your intention, not only before you are equipped for an
attack, but even before you are fortified for a defence. The consequence
is too obvious to require any further delineation, and no man who
regards the dignity and safety of his country can deny the necessity of
a military force, under the control and with the restrictions which the
new constitution provides.
Perhaps there never was a charge made with less reasons than that
which predicts the institution of a baneful aristocracy in the federal
Senate. This body branches into two characters, the one legislative and
the other executive. In its legislative character it can effect no
purpose, without the cooperation of the House of Representatives, and in
its executive character it can accomplish no object without the
concurrence of the President. Thus fettered, I do not know any act which
the Senate can of itself perform, and such dependence necessarily
precludes every idea of influence and superiority. But I will confess
that in the organization of this body a compromise between contending
interests is discernible; and when we reflect how various are the laws,
commerce, habits, population and extent of the confederated States, this
evidence of mutual concession and accommodation ought rather to command
a generous applause, than to excite jealousy and reproach. For my part,
my admiration can only be equalled by my astonishment in beholding so
perfect a system formed from such heterogeneous materials.
The next accusation I shall consider is that which represents the
federal constitution, as not only calculated, but designedly framed, to
reduce the State governments to mere corporations, and eventually to
annihilate them. Those who have employed the term corporation upon this
occasion are not perhaps aware of its extent. In common parlance,
indeed, it is generally applied to petty associations for the ease and
convenience of a few individuals; but in its enlarged sense, it will
comprehend the government of Pennsylvania, the existing union of the
States, and even this projected system is nothing more than a formal act
of incorporation. But upon what pretence can it be alleged that it was
designed to annihilate the State governments? For I will undertake to
prove that upon their existence depends the existence of the Federal
plan. For this purpose, permit me to call your attention to the manner
in which the President, Senate, and House of Representatives are
proposed to be appointed. The President is to be chosen by electors,
nominated in such manner as the legislature of each state may direct; so
that if there is no legislature, there can be no electors, and
consequently the office of President cannot be supplied. The Senate is
to be composed of two senators from each state, chosen by the
Legislature; and therefore if there is no Legislature, there can be no
Senate. The House of Representatives, is to be composed of members
chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the
electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature, - unless
therefore, there is a State Legislature, that qualification cannot be
ascertained, and the popular branch of the Federal constitution must
likewise be extinct. From this view then it is evidently absurd to
suppose, that the annihilation of the separate governments will result
from their union; or, that having that intention, the authors of the new
system would have bound their connection with such indissoluble ties.
Let me here advert to an arrangement highly advantageous, for you will
perceive, without prejudice to the powers of the Legislature in the
election of Senators, the people at large will acquire an additional
privilege in returning members to the house of representatives -
whereas, by the present confederation, it is the Legislature alone that
appoints the delegates to Congress.
The power of direct taxation has likewise been treated as an
improper delegation to the Federal government; but when we consider it
as the duty of that body to provide for the national safety, to support
the dignity of the union, and to discharge the debts contracted upon the
collective faith of the States for their common benefit, it must be
acknowledged, that those upon whom such important obligations are
imposed, ought in justice and in policy to possess every means requisite
for a faithful performance of their trust. But why should we be alarmed
with visionary evils? I will venture to predict, that the great revenue
of the United States must, and always will be raised by impost, for,
being at once less obnoxious, and more productive, the interest of the
government will be best promoted by the accommodation of the people.
Still however, the objects of direct taxation should be within reach in
all cases of emergency; and there is no more reason to apprehend
oppression in the mode of collecting a revenue from this resource, than
in the form of an impost, which, by universal assent, is left to the
authority of the Federal government. In either case, the force of civil
institutions will be adequate to the purpose; and the dread of military
violence, which has been assiduously disseminated, must eventually prove
the mere effusion of a wild imagination, or a factious spirit But the
salutary consequences that must flow from thus enabling the government
to receive and support the credit of the union, will afford another
answer to the objections upon this ground. The State of Pennsylvania
particularly, which has encumbered itself with tile assumption of a
great proportion of the public debt, will derive considerable relief and
advantage; for, as it was the imbecility of the present confederation,
which gave rise to the funding law, that law must naturally expire, when
a competent and energetic Federal system shall be substituted - the
State will then be discharged from an extraordinary burthen, and the
national creditor will find it to be his interest to return to his
original security.
After all, my fellow citizens, it is neither extraordinary or
unexpected, that the constitution offered to your consideration, should
meet with opposition. It is the nature of man to pursue his own
interest, in preference to the public good; and I do not mean to make
any personal reflection, when I add, that it is the interest of a very
numerous, powerful, and respectable body to counteract and destroy tile
excellent work produced by the late convention. All the offices of
government, and all the appointments for the administration of justice
and the collection of the public revenue, which are transferred from the
individual to the aggregate sovereignty of the States, will necessarily
turn the stream of influence and emolument into a new channel. Every
person therefore, who either enjoys, or expects to enjoy, a place of
profit under the present establishment, will object to the proposed
innovation; not, in truth, because it is injurious to the liberties of
his country, but because it affects his schemes of wealth and
consequence. I will confess indeed, that I am not a blind admirer of
this plan of government, and that there are some parts of it, which if
my wish had prevailed, would certainly have been altered. But, when I
reflect how widely men differ in their opinions, and that every man (and
observation applies likewise to every State) has an equal pretension to
assert his own, I am satisfied that anything nearer to perfection could
not have been accomplished. If there are errors, it should be
remembered, that the seeds of reformation are sown in the work itself,
and the concurrence of two thirds of the Congress may at any time
introduce alterations and amendments. Regarding it then, in every point
of view, with a candid and disinterested mind, I am bold to assert, that
it is the best form of government which has been offered in to the
world.
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